A new vision of a social enterprise: Standards and scaling social employee ownership in EU

Tej Gonza

Director of the Institute for Economic Democracy

Researcher and PhD student University of Ljubljana

The EU understands social economy as a model of economic development that seeks social and territorial cohesion, sustainability, social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth.

This is quite a broad understanding of what social economy accounts for; however, the focus remains on the business practices building social capacities and fulfilling under-met needs. Experts have argued that this marginalizes the reach of social economy.[i]

Social entrepreneurship has come under criticism for failing to disrupt the dominant power structures in the contemporary economies, which are to a large degree entrenched in the established patterns of business ownership.[ii] To disrupt the causes of wealth disparities, workplace alienation, community harm, declining political democracy, and environmental degradation, social economy must focus on changing ownership and governance rights in our economies.

In a recent *Harvard Business Review* article Roger L. Martin discussed the "long term enterprise, where chief executives would be incentivized by value enhancement, not stock price movements".[iii] Long-term enterprises are firms where *their legal structure ensures* that the value produced is widely and equitably distributed, that the governance is democratic, and the negative externalities are diminished.

The vision put forth by R. L. Martin is inherent in the employee-owned enterprise. Indeed, a democratic version of the ownership structure is part of the social enterprise as defined by the European Commission.[iv]

A democratic firm requires that the claim over profits and governance rights are not tied to a capital instrument (e.g., a share) but are tied to an active role in the business.[v] A worker cooperative is a democratic firm because membership, which brings the rights over profits and decision-making, is allowed only to the workers of the cooperative and only to the workers.

There is a problem with such a rigorous definition – it is proving to be very difficult to scale democratic firms without allowing a gradual transition. True, there is the Mondragon Corporation, which has been one of the best examples around for the past decades. And there are other European worker cooperatives, mainly concentrated in regions with high support to democratic forms of firms.

While we can list successful examples, there are relatively few of them.[1] In the US, in the half century of a cooperative development, there are now about 400 worker cooperatives employing a few thousand workers. The data from the UK also indicates paucity of worker cooperatives.[vi] Continental Europe similarly lags. The worker cooperatives enjoy the strongest capital and organisational support in Italy, where less than 300 firms converted to cooperatives in more than 30 years.[vii]

Employee ownership, on the other hand, is much more present. In the US alone, there are thousands of employee-owned firms. The most common model is Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), which today covers almost 10% of the private workforce.[viii] A similar model was legalized in the UK in 2014. IN the last eight years, more than 1000 companies converted to the UK model. Why the disparity?

The simple answer is – *conversion.* Obviously, there are successful examples of democratic start-ups, but they are few and far in between. The more effective way of redistribution capital ownership is through conversions of existing, profitable enterprises.

Now, a conversion to a worker cooperative requires a lot of financial capital by the workers or loans, that would need to be guaranteed by workers' personal assets. ESOP model, on the other hand, allows gradual conversion – and offers the financial mechanism for channelling profits of the operating company into buyout capital for the workers.

To reap the scaling opportunity embodied in the ESOP mechanism, social economy must include business firms that are only partly employee owned.

Of course, certain social standards must be guaranteed. We should not underestimate the tendency of progressive ideas to degenerate into rhetorical devices of quasi-progressive policies. Greenwashing compromised well-intended movements behind the stakeholder capitalism[ix], ESG financing strategies[x], and the CSR[xi]. Employee ownership comes in many shapes and forms – we should avoid the exclusive, speculative, capital-based, and myopic plans.

In this essay, we address two questions. First, how to guarantee that the *social* element remains inherent to employee ownership, and second, how to scale social economy through employee ownership. We conclude on a constructive note – a strong EU support is needed to encourage national programs that would enable, promote, and regulate employee-owned businesses.

Social employee ownership

We propose a set of standards for *social employee ownership*, which should help to prevent any greenwashing attempts.

Ownership must be broad-based, meaning that a great majority of workers in an enterprise must be included as owners of the enterprise. It is not sufficient that there are no legal constraints for workers to enter ownership; it is crucial that workers have the objective possibility of becoming owners, mostly in terms of financial capability. Some researchers propose that broad-based requires at least 50%of permanent employees to be included[xii], while the US ESOP and the UK EOT requires *all permanent employees* to become part of the plan, with some rare exceptions. Research

[1] And even the best examples often fail to meet the criteria of a democratic firm. For example, Mondragon has been facing challenges with declining members-to-non-members ratios.

confirms that inclusive ownership schemes lead to the best results in terms of business performance.[xiii]

Equity must be substantial and fairly distributed among the employees, to prevent concentration in the hands of the management and other highly paid individuals. Economic and governance rights are proportional to relative share in equity, so is important to consider a preliminary threshold that provides tangible benefits to the workers. It is proposed that 25% or 30% has a relevant psychological effect. The experience abroad proves that broad-based schemes must also put some limits to the distribution of shares among the workers.[xiv] Without this condition, the broad-based structure of EO would lose its inclusive nature.

Governance must be democratic, meaning that voting rights should be based on personhood not on the value of capital one holds.[2] Robert Dahl, one of the leading political scientists of the 20th century, made a convincing argument that the principles of democracy should be extended from the political into the economic; share ownership does not override the democratic standards.[xv] Indeed, research is clear that ownership must be coupled with appropriate knowledge, information transparency, and meaningful participation to achieve the optimal performance results.[xvi]

Employee ownership must be sustainable, meaning that structures should be put in place to prevent degeneration tendencies. Degeneration happens when departing employee-owners keep their shares, when incoming employees do not enter as owners, or when external parties buy shares from employee-owners.[xvii] Many successful examples of EO businesses have fell victim to degeneration processes.[xviii] It is generally possible to prevent degeneration with an appropriate legal structure and membership rules – the general idea is that the ownership right should be tied to the role in the company, not to the ability to purchase a share.

A model of social employee-owned enterprise – the European ESOP and the Slovenian precedent

The standards above must allow the scaling opportunities. This means that we need to construct a model, which allows gradual conversion to social employee ownership. At the Institute for Economic Democracy, we have recently proposed the European ESOP, which achieves this.[3]

The model builds on the best international practice and considers the special character of the European legal and cultural environment. European ESOP mimics the features that make the US ESOP and the UK EOT so successful in conversions.

Like in the US ESOP and the UK EOT, the shares are paid for through the ESOP contribution, which operating company transfer to the EOC annually. The idea is that the operating company guarantees a cash flow to the special purpose vehicle, which holds shares under the name of

[2] There are various practical ways of aiming for the democratic principle with EO, which avoid the need to democratize the governance structure at the level of the operating company. The European ESOP offers one such model.

[3] The European ESOP was featured in the European Federation for Employee Share Ownership (2019), the SozialMarie Prize for Social Innovation (2021), the book 'Ownership: Reinventing Companies, Capitalism, and Who Owns What' (2022), and in the recent report by the European Commission titled Transition Pathway of the Proximity and Social Economy Ecosystem (2022).

employees. ESOP-type buyout uses the cheapest capital out there – buyout finance is tax-deductible expense for the operating company!

The European ESOP uses a special type of a cooperative as the ownership trust - the employee ownership cooperative (EOC). Members of the EOC are all the current employees of the operating company who have been with the firm a certain period of time. The cooperative board, democratically elected by the members, receives the vote at the company's board, which is proportional to the relative number of shares held by the EOC.

Shares are individuated through the individual capital accounts (ICAs), found in ESOPs and Mondragon cooperatives. This means that workers have individualized claim over the reinvested part of the net income, preventing certain skewed investment incentives that were part of the historical democratic business models.

The trust ownership structure with individuated economic rights makes European ESOP a model of *indirect individual employee ownership*. The model is broad-based, the distribution of equity among workers is limited to pay ratios, decision-making is democratic (through EOC), and the plan is sustainable since new employees are automatically included and departing workers are automatically paid out.

In the last year, first pilots of European ESOP were implemented in Slovenian companies. So far, four companies adopted the so called sloESOP, which is the national adaptation of the European ESOP principles. The biggest company, Inea d.o.o., with 90 workers, established a 100% sloESOP, which means that 100% of shares were bought by the employees. The future outlook is even brighter – we anticipate that in 2023, up to 1000 new workers will become co-owners through the sloESOP employee ownership model.[4]

The next big step is to pass the legislation that would regulate and incentivize sloESOP conversions in Slovenia. In collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, the Institute for Economic Democracy recently prepared a special piece of legislation, which would guarantee tax incentives for (i) shareholder deciding to convert their businesses to employee ownership, (ii) for creditors lending to ESOPs, and (iii) for the ESOP contribution to be classified as tax-deductible expense.

The law should provide sufficient regulation to prevent any abuse of tax incentives. The main safety nets are that (i) the tax-deductible expense is tied proportionally to a share held by the EOC – company may transfer a % of before-tax profit that does not exceed the % of the company owned by the EOC, (ii) at least 85% of permanent workers must be included in the plan, and (iii), the shares held by EOC must be represented democratically. In a cooperative, workers elect their representatives who vote on the board of the operating company (proportional to the relative number of shares held by the EOC).

Zooming out – employee ownership and positive social externalities

[4] While the number seems small, we need to consider that Slovenia has 600.000 workers in the SME sector. For the pilot phase, the number is quite significant.

Chaire TerrESS
Territoires de l'Économie Sociale et Solidaire

We argue that social responsibility is achieved if national policies are adopted that would scale social employee ownership. Research confirms this – studies have found that broad-based and participatory employee ownership practices lead to numerous socio-economic benefits.

EO decreases economic inequality. The current levels of economic inequality are socially detrimental and currently increasing in Europe.[xix] European Commission put tackling inequality on the lists of Sustainable Development goals.[xx] So far, the main policy for reducing inequality is governmental redistribution, predominately in the form of progressive taxation and social welfare. Redistribution may not be sufficient in reducing inequality because it does not affect the pre-taxed market outcomes and often leads to political polarization.[xxi] Scholars have argued that rather than redistributing income, government must put policies in place that *pre*-distribute income, that is, policies that create market conditions that produce more equitable outcomes from the start.[xxii] Employee ownership is a bipartisan policy for pre-distribution, which proves to be very effective in tackling economic inequality.[xxiii]

EO offers a tool for addressing ownership succession in the SME sector. Every year, 450.000 European businesses are changing owners, and with that, more than 2 million workers are changing employers. European Commission warns that up to a third of these jobs may be under threat because of unsuccessful ownership succession.[xxiv] Unresolved ownership succession threatens jobs, local communities, and even national economies. Europe needs alternative tools to functioning capital markets, family succession, and private equity markets, which are all relevant but insufficient in dealing with the problem. The US and the UK use employee ownership to provide a succession tool to SMEs.[xxv] In addition to solving the primary problem, EO provides a neat exit to business owners who want to maintain their organisational legacy and provide a responsible ownership model for the local community, where EO business is embedded.

EO increases material security. Perpetual crises that are putting liquidity pressures on SMEs lead to uncertain employment conditions for millions of workers globally[xxvi], with economic insecurity again becoming one of the major social issues experienced by the working class.[xxvii] Studies prove that EO businesses are on average more resilient in times of crisis[xxviii] and provide more stable jobs[xxix]. In addition to increasing material security, EO can be considered as an anti-cyclical economic policy.[xxx]

EO has positive effects on workers wellbeing. Adam Smith discussed how specialization in the workplace may lead to psychological alienation of workers[xxxi]. Empirical research today confirms that the position of a hired worker leads to negative effects on mental health, personal satisfaction, and productivity.[xxxii] Employee ownership together with strong ownership culture builds sense of control and autonomy, which leads to improved well-being, performance, and has positive psychological effects for workers.[xxxiii]

EO provides an ownership structure that regulates negative externalities. Government plays an essential role in regulating negative effects on third parties; however, it is also worth noting that different types of ownership structure have different inherent tendencies towards their immediate environment. When it comes to EO businesses, owners and decision-makers are often citizens of local communities. In this way, EO disincentivizes negative externalities and incentivizes positive externalities. Research indicates that EO businesses provide more stable jobs, take care of local communities, and avoid environmentally harmful business operation.[xxxiv]

EO anchors the value in the local communities and national economies. Employee-owned businesses on average outperform conventional businesses in terms of productivity, growth, and crisis resilience.[xxxv] In addition to this, EO distributes added value to the workers, takes care of the local communities, and anchors ownership of capital within national borders, ensuring that taxes are paid nationally on the long-run.[xxxvi]

Scaling social employee ownership in Europe

ESOPs in the US and EOTs in the UK provide tangible evidence that the recipe for scaling is a standardized model encouraged through national fiscal policies, supported by specialized organizations, and assisted through different financial mechanisms. Canada and Australia are following the lead.[xxxvii]

Despite these positive developments globally, EU is missing a unified front. The existing EU single market regulation on state aid prevent any kind of positive governmental discrimination that would distort competition unless there is an exemption granted by the European Commission. While social economy already received certain exemptions for state aid, the exemptions should also be extended to the legal structure of the enterprise that satisfies the conditions of social employee ownership.

European Commission should encourage nation states to follow economic policies that promote the development of supportive legal, financial, and organisational environment, which should encourage conversion to employee ownership but also aid existing employee-owned firms.

National policy, which should be supported by the EU exceptions to single market policies, could include (i) laws providing tax incentives and regulation for employee ownership conversions, (ii) alternative use of unemployment benefits as start-up capital for employee-owned companies, (iii) accessible financial mechanisms and loan guarantees by the state developmental banks, (iv) development of specialized state or private supportive organisations with a strong legal, organisational, and entrepreneurial know how, (v) special treatment of employee-owned firms for the public procurements and subsidies, and (vi) a structured advocacy strategy aimed at the public, relevant stakeholders, and the business community.

---

[i] Ash Amin, Angus Cameron, and Ray Hudson, *Placing the Social Economy* (London: Routledge, 2002), 2, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203166123.
[ii] Pascal Dey and Chris Steyaert, "Social Entrepreneurship: Critique and the Radical Enactment of the Social," ed. Simon Teasdale, *Social Enterprise Journal* 8, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 90–107, https://doi.org/10.1108/17508611211252828; Pascal Dey and Chris Steyaert, *Social Entrepreneurship: An Affirmative Critique* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018); A. H. J. (Bert) Helmsing, "Conditions for Social Entrepreneurship," *The International Journal of Social Quality* 5, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 51–66, https://doi.org/10.3167/IJSQ.2015.050104.
[iii] Roger L. Martin, "It's Time to Replace the Public Corporation," *Harvard Business Review*, January 1, 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/01/its-time-to-replace-the-public-corporation.
[iv] European Commission, "European Action Plan for Social Economy" (European Commission, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12743-EU-action-plan-for-social-economy_en.
[v] David P. Ellerman, *The Democratic Worker-Owned Firm: A New Model for the East and West* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); David Ellerman, *Neo-Abolitionism: Abolishing Human Rentals in Favor of Workplace Democracy* (Springer International Publishing, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62676-1.
[vi] Edward J. Carberry, "Employee Ownership and Shared Capitalism: Assessing the Experience, Research, and Policy Implications," *Employee Ownership and Shared Capitalism: New Directions in Research. Champaign, IL: Labor and Employment Relations Association*, 2011, 1–26.

[vii] Salvatore Monni et al., "Workers' Buyout: The Italian Experience, 1986-2016," *Journal of Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues* 4 (June 1, 2017): 526–39, https://doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2017.4.4(10).
[viii] Corey Rosen and John Case, *Ownership: Reinventing Companies, Capitalism, and Who Owns What* (Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2022).
[ix] Stefan J. Padfield, "Crony Stakeholder Capitalism," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY, July 15, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4164089.
[x] Nathan Barrymore, "Greenwashing, Firm ESG Strategy, and Employee Impact," 2022, https://doi.org/10.13016/ifre-uwvz.
[xi] Lois S. Mahoney et al., "A Research Note on Standalone Corporate Social Responsibility Reports: Signaling or Greenwashing?," *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 24, no. 4 (June 1, 2013): 350–59, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2012.09.008.
[xii] Yael V. Hochberg and Laura Lindsey, "Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options," *The Review of Financial Studies* 23, no. 11 (November 1, 2010): 4148–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq093.
[xiii] Rosen and Case, *Ownership*; Joseph Blasi, Douglas Kruse, and Richard B. Freeman, "Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership and Profit Sharing: History, Evidence, and Policy Implications," *Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership* 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 38–60, https://doi.org/10.1108/JPEO-02-2018-0001; Joseph Blasi, Richard Freeman, and Douglas Kruse, "Do Broad-Based Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing and Stock Options Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?: Linkages among Group Incentive Methods of Compensation," *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 54, no. 1 (March 2016): 55–82, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12135.
[xiv] ANDREW Pendleton, "Employee Ownership in Britain: Diverse Forms, Diverse Antecedents," *Employee Ownership and Shared Capitalism: New Directions in Research*, 2011, 311–39.
[xv] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (University of California Press, 1985).
[xvi] Niels Mygind and Thomas Poulsen, "Employee Ownership – Pros and Cons – a Review," *Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership* 4, no. 2 (January 1, 2021): 136–73, https://doi.org/10.1108/JPEO-08-2021-0003; Roberto Frega, "Employee Involvement and Workplace Democracy," *Business Ethics Quarterly*, October 7, 2020, 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2020.30.
[xvii] Simon Pek, "Drawing Out Democracy: The Role of Sortition in Preventing and Overcoming Organizational Degeneration in Worker-Owned Firms," *Journal of Management Inquiry* 30, no. 2 (April 1, 2021): 193–206, https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492619868030; William I. Sauser, "Sustaining Employee Owned Companies: Seven Recommendations," *Journal of Business Ethics* 84, no. 2 (2009): 151–64.
[xviii] John Pencavel, *Worker Participation: Lessons from Worker Co-Ops of the Pacific Northwest* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Ignacio Bretos and Anjel Errasti, "Challenges and Opportunities for the Regeneration of Multinational Worker Cooperatives: Lessons from the Mondragon Corporation—a Case Study of the Fagor Ederlan Group," *Organization* 24, no. 2 (March 1, 2017): 154–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508416656788.
[xix] Stephanie Bergbauer, Alessandro Giovannini, and Nils Hernborg, "Economic Inequality and Public Trust in the European Central Bank," April 27, 2022, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202203_02~f9d2d059f0.en.html.
[xx] European Commission, "Sustainable Development Goals," 2022, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/sustainable-development-goals_en.
[xxi] Herwig Immervoll and Linda Richardson, "Redistribution Policy and Inequality Reduction in OECD Countries: What Has Changed in Two Decades?," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2011, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1948026; Antoine Bozio, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret, and Malka Guillot, "Predistribution vs. Redistribution: Evidence from France and the U.S," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY, October 1, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3723639.
[xxii] Bozio, Goupille-Lebret, and Guillot, "Predistribution vs. Redistribution"; Alan P. Thomas, *Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property Owning Democracy* (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2017); David Ellerman, "On the Labor Theory of Property: Is the Problem Distribution or Predistribution?," *Challenge: The Magazine of Economic Affairs* 60, no. 2 (2017): 171–88, https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/05775132.2017.1279906; Martin O'Neill, "The Promise of Predistribution," in *Policy Network - Predistribution and the Crisis in Living Standards*, 2012; Branko Milanovic, *Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2019).

[xxiii] Thomas Dudley and Ethan Rouen, "Employee Ownership and Wealth Inequality: A Path to Reducing Wealth Concentration," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, September 30, 2021), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3942536; Joseph R. Blasi and Douglas L. Kruse, "Building the Assets of Low and Moderate Income Workers and Their Families: The Role of Employee-Ownership" (Rutgers University: Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing, March 2019), https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/rutgerskelloggreport_april2019.pdf.
[xxiv] European Commission, "COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS An SME Strategy for a Sustainable and Digital Europe" (2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A103%3AFIN.
[xxv] Carl Pitchford, "Employee Ownership as a Solution to the SME Succession Issue: An Analysis of Furniture Industry Conversions to Employee Ownership in the United States, United Kingdom, and France," *Journal of Organizational Psychology* 21, no. 4 (September 7, 2021), https://doi.org/10.33423/jop.v21i4.4547; Robert A. Frisch, *ESOP: The Ultimate Instrument in Succession Planning*, 2nd ed (New York: Wiley, 2001).
[xxvi] International Labor Organization, "ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work. 5th Edition," Briefing note (International Labor Organization, June 30, 2020), http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/impacts-and-responses/WCMS_749399/lang--en/index.htm; Andre Dua et al., "Which Small Businesses Are Most Vulnerable to COVID-19--and When" (McKinsey, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/americas/which-small-businesses-are-most-vulnerable-to-covid-19-and-when#.
[xxvii] Valentina Ausserladscheider, "Beyond Economic Insecurity and Cultural Backlash: Economic Nationalism and the Rise of the Far Right," *Sociology Compass* 13, no. 4 (2019): e12670, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12670; Bruce Western et al., "Economic Insecurity and Social Stratification," *Annual Review of Sociology* 38, no. 1 (August 11, 2012): 341–59, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145434.
[xxviii] Fidan Ana Kurtulus and Douglas L. Kruse, *How Did Employee Ownership Firms Weather the Last Two Recessions? Employee Ownership, Employment Stability, and Firm Survival: 1999-2011* (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2107), https://doi.org/10.17848/9780880995276; Bruno Roelants et al., "The Resilience of the Cooperative Model" (CICOPA Europe, 2012), https://issuu.com/cicopa/docs/report_cecop_2012_en_web; Giles Tremlett, "Mondragon: Spain's Giant Co-Operative Where Times Are Hard but Few Go Bust," *The Guardian*, March 7, 2013, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/07/mondragon-spains-giant-cooperative.
[xxix] Fidan Ana Kurtulus and Douglas Kruse, "An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Employee Ownership and Employment Stability in the US: 1999–2011," *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 56, no. 2 (2018): 245–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12254.
[xxx] Tej Gonza, "Employee-Owned Firms: The Multiciplicity of Crisis, Resilience, and Social Responsibility," in *The Virus Aftermath: A Socio-Economi Twist*, 1st ed. (Ljubljana: Časnik Finance, 2020, 2020), 401–20.
[xxxi] Robert Lamb, "Adam Smith's Concept of Alienation," *Oxford Economic Papers* 25, no. 2 (1973): 275–85.
[xxxii] Amanda Shantz et al., "Drivers and Outcomes of Work Alienation: Reviving a Concept," *Journal of Management Inquiry* 24, no. 4 (October 1, 2015): 382–93, https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492615573325; Lars G. Tummers and Laura Den Dulk, "The Effects of Work Alienation on Organisational Commitment, Work Effort and Work-to-Family Enrichment," *Journal of Nursing Management* 21, no. 6 (2013): 850–59, https://doi.org/10.1111/jonm.12159; Sara K. Clark et al., "Temporary Worker Alienation and Job Performance: The Impact of Rating Source," *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies* 17, no. 3 (August 1, 2010): 287–97, https://doi.org/10.1177/1548051810368679.
[xxxiii] Richard J. Long, "Job Attitudes and Organizational Performance Under Employee Ownership," *Academy of Management Journal* 23, no. 4 (December 1980): 726–37, https://doi.org/10.5465/255559; Linn Van Dyne and Jon L. Pierce, "Psychological Ownership and Feelings of Possession: Three Field Studies Predicting Employee Attitudes and Organizational Citizenship Behavior," *Journal of Organizational Behavior: The International Journal of Industrial, Occupational and Organizational Psychology and Behavior* 25, no. 4 (2004): 439–59; Marco Caramelli and Alain Briole, "Employee Stock Ownership and Job Attitudes: Does Culture Matter," *Human Resource Management Review*, July 1, 2020, https://www.academia.edu/4872588/Employee_stock_ownership_and_job_attitudes_Does_culture_matter; Alex Bryson et al., "Share Capitalism and Worker Wellbeing," *Labour Economics* 42 (October 1, 2016):

151–58, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.09.002; NCEO, “Employee Ownership and Economic Well-Being: A Research Project of the National Center for Employee Ownership,” NCEO NLS, 2017, https://www.ownershipeconomy.org/.

[xxxiv] Asmaa Boukhima and Tahar Khallouki, “Employee Stock Ownership in Morocco: Between Legal Reality and Need for Evolution,” in *Employee Share Ownership and Impacts on Organizational Value and Behavior* (IGI Global, 2022), 146–59, https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-8557-3.ch008; Sarah Stranahan and Marjorie Kelly, “Mission-Led Employee-Owned Firms: The Best of the Best,” The Democracy Collaborative, 2019, https://democracycollaborative.org/learn/publication/mission-led-employee-owned-firms-best-best; Jamin A. Hübner, “Owning Up to It: Why Cooperatives Create the Humane Economy Our World Needs,” *Faith and Economics*, January 1, 2020, https://www.academia.edu/53831514/Owning_Up_to_It_Why_Cooperatives_Create_the_Humane_Economy_our_World_Needs; Stranahan and Kelly, “Mission-Led Employee-Owned Firms”; Virginie Pérotin, “Worker Cooperatives: Good, Sustainable Jobs in the Community,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, May 20, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2437929.

[xxxv] Arnaud Chevalier, “Does Employee Ownership Improve Performance?,” *IZA World of Labor*, 2022, 311–311; Romain Boulongne, “Productivity Gains and Firm Ownership: The Case of the French Worker Cooperatives,” *Academy of Management Proceedings* 2022, no. 1 (August 2022): 15878, https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2022.15878abstract; Mygind and Poulsen, “Employee Ownership – Pros and Cons – a Review”; Blasi, Kruse, and Freeman, “Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership and Profit Sharing.”

[xxxvi] Deborah Groban Olson, “Employee Ownership: An Economic Development Tool for Anchoring Capital in Local Communities,” *New York University Review of Law & Social Change* 15 (1987 1986): 239.

[xxxvii] Graeme Nuttal, “How the UK Is Encouraging Employee Ownership Internationally,” *Fieldfisher* (blog), 2022, https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/insights/how-the-uk-is-encouraging-employee-ownership-inter.